LOBBYING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE:
A CHALLENGE

ЛОББИРОВАНИЕ СОЦИАЛЬНЫХ ИЗМЕНЕНИЙ:
НОВЫЕ ВЫЗОВЫ

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One of the questions raised by lobbying campaigns made by citizen-driven organizations and civil society (above NGOs) is the possibility of evaluating efficiency. Researches on NGOs (Scholte, 2009; Reitig, 2011; Betsill & Corell, 2001) underline the lack of efficient strategies that are able to lobby the policy makers. In this paper, we examine methods of lobbying and procedures of communication used for lobbying and we propose indicators to evaluate actions able to define the efficiency of NGO campaigns.

Our methodology is based on literary review, and moreover on cooperation with citizen-driven organizations. This cooperation gives us access to events, campaign meetings, communication material, etc. Interviews with policy officers and officials of the European institutions in Brussels complete the methodology.

With three campaigns of citizen-driven organizations, the aim is to identify success and failure in their strategies. Our research reveals three different results:

- *Lobbying, at least at the EU or UN level, should rely on the complete set of communication tools and channels able to reach different types of publics in order to raise or maintain awareness, and finally convince decision makers to vote for a law (national level) or a resolution (UN level).*

- *While discovering social media, NGOs would have better results if they followed the trends issued by private companies to promote their products: consideration and dialogue, both with policy makers and their public.*

- *The proliferation of tools and channels available for delivering messages can deliver several "incoherent messages," i.e. messages more or less adapted to the specificity of each channel and to each public. In return, this creates an imprecise communication not in favour of the NGO.*

Key words: *influence, lobbying, social change, NGO, efficiency.*

Один из вопросов, который возникает в связи с лоббистскими компаниями, проводимыми неправительственными организациями (далее НПО), связан с возможностью оценки их эффективности. Исследователи НПО (Scholte, 2009; Reitig, 2011; Betsill & Corell, 2001) отмечают нехватку эффективных стратегий, направленных на лоббирование политиков. В данной статье мы исследуем методы лоббирования и коммуникативные процедуры, используемые для лоббирования, и предлагаем индикаторы для оценки эффективности кампаний НПО.

Наша методология основана на обзоре литературы и сотрудничестве с неправительственными организациями. Благодаря этому сотрудничеству мы получили доступ к мероприятиям, встречам с общественностью, информационным материалам и сообщениям и т. д. Интервью с представителями Европейских институтов в Брюсселе также стали составной частью нашего исследования. В ходе анализа трех лоббистских компаний, проведенных НПО, мы стремились определить их успешные и провальные стратегии. Наше исследование позволило получить следующие результаты:

- *Лоббирование, по крайней мере, на уровне ЕС и ООН, должно использовать полный набор коммуникативных инструментов и каналов для получения доступа ко всем заинтересованным сторонам с целью повышения или поддержания их осведомленности, чтобы в итоге убедить лица, принимающие решения, проголосовать за законопроект (на уровне государства) или резолюцию (на уровне ООН).*

- *С помощью социальных медиа НПО добились бы лучших результатов, используя практики коммерческих компаний для продвижения их товаров, — учет взаимных интересов и диалог одновременно с политиками и обществом.*

- *Распространение инструментов и каналов, предназначенных для доставки сообщений, может привести к доставке некоторых «неподходящих» сообщений, т.е. сообщений, недостаточно адаптированных к специфике конкретного канала или сегмента аудитории. Это вносит неточность в коммуникацию, что плохо влияет на поддержку НПО.*

Ключевые слова: *влияние, лоббирование, социальные изменения, НПО, эффективность.*

Introduction, Concepts and Methods

In Brussels, particularly since the Lisbon Treaty, the way European institutions have functioned has provided many possibilities for interest groups to proceed by lobbying. EU consultations and legislative procedures have increased, allowing inputs from member states, regional authorities, EU agencies, professional bodies, trade unions, citizen-driven organizations, etc. While there are probably as many definitions of lobbying as there are lobbyists, all definitions should nevertheless refer to the process of influencing decision-making. Even though the content and boundaries of the concept remain unclear (Coen, 2008), lobbying is a political process which aims to influence public policy and resource-allocation decisions within political, economic and social systems and institutions.

The best methods for attaining successful decisions when faced with decision-makers are highly debated. One classical distinction, in order to shed light on the subtler mechanisms between the protagonists in Brussels, is to distinguish between inside lobbying and outside lobbying (Rietig, 2011; Beyers, 2004; Almog-Bar & Schmid, 2014). Another distinction is made (Clamen, 1991) between direct lobbying, indirect lobbying and public opinion appeal. Direct lobbying covers face-to-face interactions, while indirect lobbying includes consideration of the spokesperson, a unique message repeated by different actors, the use of relays within the institution, multiple upliftings, etc. Inside and direct lobbying both refer to actions performed by contacting, meeting and arguing directly with civil servants and decision-makers. In Brussels, this is achieved inside the European Parliament, in the Commissions, through Intergroups, through informal meetings such as lunch, dinner, cocktails, events at the Press Club Europe, and so on. Outside and indirect lobbying refers to actions performed outside

the negotiation area (in this case, European institutions). This could include demonstrations, social media use, petitions, and advertisements in the press. Both rely on a process summarizable by a keyword – raising *awareness* – as testimonies of practices delivered by professionals invited during our lectures on influence and lobbying at Université libre de Bruxelles revealed.

Due to the common culture between high-level civil servants and politicians, and representatives and leaders of enterprises, these leaders tend to have easier access to policy-makers. "In terms of actor type, it has been reasoned that interest groups representing diffuse interests find it much more difficult to lobby decision-makers successfully than interest groups representing concentrated interests" (Klüver, 2011: 2). In that sense, we consider lobbying by enterprises as more of an insider procedure, as interventions from professional guests on our course can confirm. Moreover, companies do not need to gain the support of the public when they negotiate for their activities since, due to their common culture with politicians, they don't consider there to be a need for this type of support. Defining types of interests could be another distinction according to types of actors. Klüver's statement could explain the success or failure of lobbying campaigns run by citizen-driven organizations.

One solution to explain lobbying mechanisms is to look at the procedures by collecting materials and then retracing the debates and the issues. Betsill and Corel elaborated on a model in 2001 based on the traceability of information flows and documents. They suggest tracing the whole process during debates and negotiations. On that basis, a contradictory analysis can be conducted. The methodology for conducting this type of research involves collecting and analyzing a corpus composed of the following documents: primary documents, drafts, official reports, country statements and NGO lobbying materials.

But problems remain with collecting documents and retracing procedures: secrecy, restricted access to documents and privacy of negotiations are several dimensions naturally included in any type of negotiation. While such an approach provides insightful results and reveals the complex mechanisms of influence, we considered that access to some of these documents might prove very difficult if not impossible. We therefore adopted a method relying more on processes, status of negotiators and communication strategies than on document traceability.

In line with this, I argue that lobbying activities vary according to several factors: issue context, types of interests, resources, strategy and communication. Lobbying methods focus on shifting between the organizational and the procedural as the motto "the right information at the right time" suggests. By introducing a communicational perspective into the field, I consider that lobbying actions should be considered in a research perspective as a "cocktail" articulated through analog and digital networks. According to Castells, communication through networks is one of the key explanations behind the power and success of any type of action in the political field. Focusing particularly on social movements, Castells argues that, to effect change, social movements should invest the public sphere in different manners (Castells, 2011: 386). In order to succeed or raise awareness on a topic among the general public, media and politicians, an alliance of local and global actors is necessary. Castells argues that this alliance should rely on networks and digital communication. In other words, networks and communication characterize and identify the content of efficiency".

This framework leads us to our research question: regarding social change, how can we define the efficiency of actions and their organization? In order to answer this question, we will consider

action repertoires and tools of communication as variables. The subsequent review will proceed to operationalization.

Our methodology is based on a literature review, on semi-directive interviews with leaders or representatives from citizen-driven organizations. In Brussels, thanks to our registration in the European Parliament as lobbyists, we had access to events, campaign meetings, communicational materials, etc. We have selected three NGOs based in Brussels, active in social issues and motivated by political change for the reasons mentioned in the introduction.

Action Repertoires and Mediating Conditions

As mentioned earlier, lobbying is key to most social and human rights NGOs for several reasons: because of the spaces left by the state's withdrawal; because of the generalization of social media use and the cultural change induced by this phenomenon; because lobbying requires a significant investment in resources with few possibilities of a return on this investment; and because specific and evolving forms of power and legitimacy imply a continuous questioning of the messages sent to both the public and to elites. This is probably the reason why so many frameworks and documents were and are produced by the NGOs themselves on the subject. Most of these are comprehensive and detailed walkthroughs of the arcane world of globalized power, in relation to a specific theme or goal (see, among others, UNICEF, 2012; FAO, 2011; SNV World, 2009; Womankind Worldwide, 2011).

Our approach to the efficiency assessment of lobbying combines elements of various frameworks proposed by different authors, which appeared to be particularly relevant to the reality we experienced during our fieldwork. On one side, we consider action repertoires,

and on the other, the mediating conditions explaining the strengths and weaknesses of the particular sector of lobbying those NGOs need to address. Grossman and Saurugger's notion of "resources" is worth highlighting before going any further (2006). According to these authors, resources are defined as "means that give actors the ability to act and secure them a power."

Action repertoires

Action repertoires could be defined as ways to bring out resources with the aim of influencing a decision-making process, and can be classified into five ideal types:
- Negotiation and consultation: actors are invited to participate in the decision-making process;
- Use of experts: scientific data are used to support the represented interests;
- Protests: raising awareness in public spaces;
- Juridification: creation of a legal framework to defend interests;
- Politicization: transformation of an interest group into a political party (Grossman & Saurugger, 2006: 16).

Neveu proposes another detailed typology of actions and registers:
- Institutional actions, which include trials, lobbying and platforms for actors;
- Non-cooperation actions: non-participation, objection, civil disregard and boycott;
- Public legitimation actions: including petitions, protests, fasting, experts' contributions and contributions from famous people;
- Direct actions, such as sabotage, interposition, occupation, demonstration and reprisal;

- Awareness-raising actions such as festive actions, parties or picnics, and symbolic actions such as die-ins, etc. (Neveu, 2000: 40).

Our observations in Brussels relating to action repertoires show that many protagonists, especially in the NGO sector, are using multiple types of action, since efficiency nowadays requires communication to be a "cocktail," focusing on several types of audiences. The goal is to raise awareness with a unique message. In this sense, under the pressure of digital media, the frontiers between corporate, business, and political communication have changed. This means that all types of protagonists have gained access to the whole range of tools and techniques.

To analyze the efficiency of lobbying actions, a model with two dimensions is useful. On one side, we consider collective actions, and on the other, mediating conditions.

Mediating conditions and efficiency

We consider that any type of action that would support a lobbying campaign should maximize the use of communication and digital tools, which can be listed as: public relations, position papers, white papers, Internet and social media, mass media, fact-checked reports, experts and conferences, debates, and think tanks. In fact, the coherence of a message through several types of media is compulsory. This trend could be explained by the necessity to be heard by the public and the media. Cardon and Granjon in 2010 suggested three approaches to the use of digital networks by NGOs:

- The first approach is attentiveness and counter-expertise. Protagonists are able to share and verify official statements and media reports, and develop their own argumentation that could be shared on a platform with documents. Such a process supports the production of fact-checked reports.

- The second approach is subjectivity and the diversion of media – images and symbols – for example, as a parody website. After the oil pollution crisis following the BP platform incident in the Gulf of Mexico, a parody emerged, reflecting the position of BP during the several months of crisis: "BP Spills Coffee" (BP Spills Coffee, n. d).
- The third is grassroots mobilization: citizens commit themselves to the idea of reinforcing collective procedures and increasing attentiveness.

Such research is the signal that the combination of all channels or tools of communication would be useful for a strategy. A message proposed by NGOs should include the same kind of content as companies include with their brands, delivered through different registers and audiences. The next section describes the context and the strategy of our cases, which will allow us to introduce an efficiency-based comparative analysis, followed by a discussion.

Political Change Issues and NGOs' Efficient Lobbying

Political change issues are real challenges for NGOs for several reasons. First, social issues are included within a specific framework. Communication by NGOs relies on values (the reason for their activities), on a message (offering a solution rather than describing a problem), on the results (for resource allocation and accountability) and on donations as resources (Libaert & Pierlot, 2014). Another problem arises when these values and available data are confronted with actors and states, which don't always agree with such an approach, arguing that the reports and arguments of NGOs are based on norms that may not be universally accepted (see, for example, the Chinese position on human rights issues (Yu, 2007: 113–127).

To operationalize our research questions, we analyzed the procedures used by three NGOs to develop a coherent message. Analyzing the way these NGOs act, and the results obtained, has allowed us to ascertain the pertinence and the quality of their communication to assess the efficiency of their lobbying practices.

Case studies

1. The International Campaign for Tibet

The first NGO is the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), whose purpose is "to promote human rights and democratic freedoms for the people of Tibet." ICT does the following:

- "Monitors and reports on human rights and environmental and socio-economic conditions in Tibet;
- Advocates for Tibetans imprisoned for their political or religious beliefs;
- Works with governments to develop policies and programs to help Tibetans;
- Secures humanitarian and development assistance for Tibetans;
- Works with Chinese institutions and individuals to build understanding and trust, and explores relationships between Tibetans and Chinese;
- Mobilizes individuals and the international community to take action on behalf of Tibetans; and
- Promotes self-determination for the Tibetan people through negotiations between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama" (International Campaign for Tibet, n. d.).

ICT has its headquarters in Washington DC and offices in Brussels, Amsterdam, Berlin, and London. We conducted a semi-directive interview with Vincent Metten, EU Policy Officer at the ICT office in Brussels. Metten defines his work as both exercising

political influence and acting as an informational agent. He makes no difference between advocacy and lobbying and considers the following elements as best practice.

He insisted first on the quality of information, which can be achieved through a good network and regular contacts. ICT uses the services of a specialized company, in charge of providing intelligence and information on any piece of news or event related to their field, according to information management. This allows the implementation of the second best practice point identified during the interview: being proactive rather than reactive to the news. To be proactive means to get the information at the right time in order to provide good information to those people requiring it to determine their position or their vote. For example, on the 22nd of October 2013, the second Universal Periodic Review of the People's Republic of China (PRC) was adopted at the UN offices in Geneva. A month before, ICT provided selected members with a twenty-page report balancing the official arguments of the PRC. Before they travelled to Geneva, all participants were briefed in order to raise their awareness of the important issues of the meeting.

Metten's third point was to provide precise and detailed information together with material and recommendations to the stakeholders. This can be achieved through the delivery of newsletters, reports, and public relation releases, etc. His final point, which could also be the first, relates to the quality of research and to the subsequent quality of information resulting from this research. Precise arguments and figures in communication materials provide arguments and enhance the reception of the message by the media and policy-makers. Staff recruitment and training is a key factor in reaching an adequate level of practice.

As already pointed out, human rights lobbying by NGOs and citizen-driven organizations should be different from the lobbying

done by the corporate and private sector. Vincent Metten argues that human rights lobbying is based on values, ethics and morals. He asserts that the human dimension and transparency procedures are important. Human, financial and technological resources are scarcer in NGOs than in the corporate sector. However, he also argues that the communication and lobbying techniques used in both sectors are the same. In other words, the emotional and human dimensions might be the only difference between NGO and corporate lobbyists.

Some obstacles were pointed out – on the particular question of Tibet, bias and ignorance are important. The debate is political and the PRC has strong strategies to counter this lobbying – for example, certain actors consider the Dalai Lama to have a hidden agenda.

Considering action repertoires, Metten does not really believe in petitions, online or not. He considers op-eds efficient in exposing a point of view. Protests are also an important element for three reasons: first for the Tibetans and their supporters themselves, in order to nourish their motivation; second to gain attention from the media and the general public; and third to show that opponents of the PRC are active.

The capacity to provide Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) with information is a key point. They appreciate receiving position papers, arguments and reports. The most successful action would be to provide an amendment that would be included in official European texts. For Metten, a successful lobbying campaign is the result of a combination of media and communication and direct statements to MEPs and diplomats in order to reach several types of protagonists from different circles simultaneously. Our observations, undertaken during five events organized by ICT at the European Parliament and in Brussels (intergroup meetings and two

protest days, in March 2013 and February 2014) clearly reflected this combination.

2. The Control Arms campaign, by Amnesty International

We present the Control Arms campaign, run by Amnesty International. This is a good example, because it includes all the structural and mediating conditions developed above.

Since 2003, Amnesty International have run the Control Arms campaign from their headquarters in London: "Control Arms is a global civil society alliance campaigning for a 'bulletproof' Arms Trade Treaty that will protect lives and livelihoods. A 'bulletproof' Arms Trade Treaty means an international, legally binding agreement that will stop transfers of arms and ammunitions that fuel conflict, poverty and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law" (Control Arms, n. d.).

The idea of an Arms Trade Treaty first came from Nobel Peace Laureates, supported by civil society organizations worldwide. In 2003, the Control Arms campaign was launched and has since gathered support for the Arms Trade Treaty from over a million people worldwide. In 2006, Control Arms handed over a global petition called the "Million Faces" to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. In December 2006, 153 governments finally voted at the United Nations to start work on developing a global Arms Trade Treaty. Momentum for the treaty has been building ever since.

In 2009 the UN General Assembly launched a time frame for the negotiation of the Arms Trade Treaty. This included one preparatory meeting in 2010 and two in 2011, before the final negotiating conference scheduled for July 2012 (Control Arms, n. d.). In April 2013, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was signed, but ratification is still under process.

Besides the political and military aspects, the case is quite complex. First, to develop precise arguments able to convince UN members, the NGO had to investigate the arms trade, illegal air flights and non-respected embargos by arms manufacturers. Members of the NGO did research at exhibitions (Milipol: an exhibition on internal state security in Paris), on battlefields (Congo, Togo), and online, by checking databases and the Web in order to collect data, flight plans, information on arms manufacturers, and pictures. Some salient elements are described in Andrew Niccol's movie Lord of War. This movie has similarities with the life of Viktor Bout, and Amnesty International endorsed the film for highlighting arms trafficking (Lord of War, n. d).

Amnesty International produced fact-checked reports. These well-documented reports became arguments, synthesized by the lobbying and communication team. In order to convince politicians and sway public opinion, a two-branch strategy was used: a lobbyist approach and a grassroots approach. Throughout the year, lobbyists working for Amnesty sent press releases, reports, and arguments to the United Nations delegates in New York. Control Arms campaigners lobbied states to make positive statements on the ATT, in particular to get support for the current version of the Chair's non-papers, to be used as the starting point for the negotiation conference. In addition, Control Arms members made a presentation to states and organized a number of well-attended side events. Then, once a year, during the UN General Assembly, they tried to convince the delegates at the ambassadors' level to vote in favour of the ATT project.

But this strategy is not enough for an NGO, nor, more generally, for agents who need to receive the support of the public sphere. A complete set of communication tools was used to influence the public and gain attention from the media: press conferences,

demonstrations in the streets, websites (including online petitions), Twitter, Facebook pages, expert testimony and reports, and support from stars (for example, in France, from Lillian Thuram, a famous French soccer player). Parody videos were also posted on YouTube (for a teleshopping parody, see CONTROL ARMS CAMPAIGN: Teleshop AK-47, n. d.).

This strategy fulfills the three conditions of Cardon and Grajon (set in 2010): counter-expertise (i.e. fact-checked reports), parody, and grassroots mobilization. The project also reveals an insightful strategy by combining direct lobbying done in the corridors of the UN offices with indirect lobbying. This indirect lobbying was well managed by aligning online and offline communication; for example, experts, stars and specific networks, such as health care professionals, were all mobilized (elements on the whole strategy are available on Armes, trafic et raison d'Etat, 2012).

Moreover, this strategy filled the framework: mediating conditions, inside and outside lobbying, pressure of civil society on politicians, having contact during the UN assembly with high-level representatives. We consider this case as a complete one, according to the framework presented. The determination and the commitment of Amnesty during the 14 years of campaign may be the final element necessary to understand the success.

3. Crisis Action and the Trading Away Peace program

Two extracts from the Trading Away Peace program can be used to sum up this case: "The European Union's position is absolutely clear: Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory are 'illegal under international law, constitute an obstacle to peace, and threaten to make a two-state solution impossible'. Yet this report shows how European policies help sustain the settlements. It reveals that the EU imports approximately fifteen times more from the

illegal settlements than from the Palestinians themselves" (Trading Away Peace: How Europe Helps Sustain Illegal Israeli Settlements, 2012: 6).

The argument of Crisis Action and its twenty-two partners is that: "[...] by accepting imports of settlement goods designated as originating in 'Israel', Europe is tacitly accepting Israel's creeping expansion of sovereignty. And by permitting the sale of settlement products mislabeled as 'Made in Israel', governments are failing to protect consumers' legal right to make an informed choice about purchasing settlement goods" (ibid: p. 26).

On February 2014, we conducted a semi-directive interview with Martin Konecny, at that time working for Crisis Action on that program. The key elements for explaining the success of the "Trade Away Peace program" reflect a particular approach.

Firstly, Crisis Action has coordinated its action with several other NGOs, players and VIPs (a word used during the interview). The VIPs, without referring to their implication within this campaign, have advocated for this cause.

Secondly, the lobbying was not only concentrated in Brussels, toward high-level civil servants and diplomats, but was very proactive in the direction of member states' capitals. Konecny explained that this is often a failure in the NGO's strategy, since they lack contacts and relays in the main European capitals.

Thirdly, the campaign was based on high-level information and a precise timeline, linked with good access to policy-makers. Linked to that, reactivity and the capacity to maintain the strategy by "going the extra mile" were important. The configuration was favorable because lots of politicians, aware of the situation, were frustrated by the Israeli settlements.

Fourthly, the campaign was based on a practical objective – something that was not utopian – in a very professional way,

reflected by the quality of the work produced by Crisis Action. On the contrary, Konecny argued that too many NGOs in Brussels have too many activities, and are producing too many documents that are presented in many meetings. He explained that NGOs would have a better approach if they developed a few higher-quality actions. Concerning this, he gave the same argument as Vincent Metten: the quality of information, of documents and therefore of lobbying actions, relies on the quality of the team.

This case is interesting because it shows that the two frameworks outlined above are not completely relevant. On the inside/outside model, only the "inside" part is valid, showing an approach more often described by enterprises for which direct access of consultants to policy-makers is a common strategy (Demortain, 2005).

At the time of research, our final framework was composed of the mediating conditions and of the inside and outside analysis completed with our contribution. From our communication perspective, we consider that an efficient lobbying strategy should rely on a coherent and clear message, sent and spread to different publics. This should be done in a comprehensive manner, using all the available tools, as part of a well-adjusted cocktail. For example, a social media strategy should be clear and efficient; any unclear or imprecise use can create confusion.

The table below (*Table 1*) sums up our results on the basis of the presented framework on efficiency, mediating conditions and types of channels.

Table 1

Research results, source, and our compilation

	Control Arms	International Campaign for Tibet	Crisis Action
Negotiation and consultation	Yes, at UN level	Yes, at EU level	Yes
Use of experts	Yes	No	No
Protests: raising awareness	Yes	Yes	No
Juridification	Yes, proposing a resolution at the UN	No	Yes, with European parliament
Politicization	No	No	No
Public relations	Term equivalent to lobbying for them	Term equivalent to lobbying for them	Term equivalent to lobbying for them
Position papers	No	Yes	No
White papers	No	No	No
Internet and social media	Yes, with five social media platforms. Messages adapted to audiences	Yes for Internet, No for Social media. Only one audience	Yes for Internet, No for Social media
Mass media	No, if we except coverage which is the result of the other actions	No, if we except coverage which is the result of the other actions	No
Fact-checked reports	Yes, with reports available on pdf format	Yes, with reports available on pdf format	Yes, with reports available on pdf format
Experts and conferences	Yes	No	No for experts and yes for relays supporting the cause. High-level access, quality of relays
Debates and think tanks	No	No	No

This figure helps us to arrive at our conclusion on the conditions for efficiency of lobbying procedures of NGOs engaged in political change.

Discussion and Conclusion

Efficiency of lobbying procedures

Confronting policy-makers, one major criterion is the "level" of contact. In other words, when an organization can have access to high-level decision-makers, to an ambassador, to an influent MEP or to an advisor at a ministry cabinet level, it reveals that the organization is recognized and credible. It is proof of professionalism and of the ability of an organization to provide useful information through fact-checked reports, if they exist. In other words, "doors are opened." Table 1 shows that the three NGOs are using this tool, which confirms that a lobbying strategy is founded on facts and data able to support an argument. Access to high-level members and committees before and during negotiation processes is fundamental for delivering messages and recommendations to key actors. It clearly relies on a long process devoted to positioning NGOs as reliable protagonists in the opinion of policy-makers. Vincent Metten from the International Campaign for Tibet confirms that one indicator of success is the capacity to be invited to participate in important events. For example, during the EU Spanish presidency in 2009, ICT was invited to a seminar on human rights between the EU and China. Reports, arguments issued from these reports, precision and coherence of the message and, finally, contacts to deliver this message are the key items defining efficiency.

Our research confirms that lobbying is changing from a period characterized by face-to-face relations between high-level civil

servants and lobbyists, to a juridical area where a decision-making process is the turning point around which multiple stakeholders act (Guegen, 2013). Here ICT seems too weak to face the actions of China. Instead, Amnesty and Crisis action have as a final goal the vote of resolution at the UN or a statement at the European parliament.

Another dimension of a successful lobbying action is the ability to deliver a message adapted to different audiences through media and digital tools. It is clear that NGOs working on social issues and engaged in political change need more support from the media and from public opinion than from enterprises[1]. NGOs gain part of their efficiency through their recognition by the public and by institutional actors. Recently created and/or small NGOs with fewer resources still need to gain attention and be trusted by their counterparts. In many cases, while discovering and using social media, NGOs would have better results if they followed the path opened by private companies to promote their products, or by political parties to promote their ideas: awareness, consideration and dialogue with their audience.

On that, Amnesty has a perfect, complete, and long-lasting use of all types of media. ICT is too small to succeed in that way and Crisis action clearly explain during their interview that media and general public were never included in their strategy.

The International Campaign for Tibet case highlights two points: the organization respects the inside and outside dimensions of lobbying procedures, and the lobbying done in Brussels includes the dimensions discussed above. The interview reveals that the Chinese side is obliged to take into account the actions of ICT, which may

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[1] Even if enterprises do attempt to gain adhesion or to create dialogue through social media, or through less comprehensive methods, such as astroturfing.

appear as an indicator of efficiency. But due to limited resources and the power of the People's Republic of China, ICT faces lots of difficulties in contributing to significant changes in Tibetan rights.

We can analyze Amnesty International's successful campaign on the Arms Trade Treaty through the framework of the mediating conditions. Amnesty has built an important network that provides resources of many types (156 NGOs in 132 countries). The campaign has a duration of more than fourteen years and the topic is a very sensitive one for the media and the public.[2] A coherent message was delivered through digital and relational dimensions throughout the campaign, covering the communication dimensions previously analyzed. We may also mention that, due to the moral dimension of the topic, arms suppliers and state-owned enterprises within this sector are not supposed to show any visible opposition.

The approach chosen by Crisis Action is totally different. It is summed up on the website, on the page entitled "How we work": "Crisis Action works behind the scenes to support a diverse range of partners to campaign against conflict and for the protection of civilians. We aim to amplify the impact of collective campaigning and enhance partners' efforts to avert conflict, prevent human rights abuses and ensure governments fulfill their obligations to protect civilians.

"Crisis Action operates in a flexible manner with partners choosing to engage in temporary 'opt-in' alliances on specific crises. The support we provide is determined by the specific circumstances of each crisis and may include warning of emerging crises and

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[2] Kietig (2011) has followed the environmental NGOs' negotiations during climate change sessions between 2009 and 2011. His study shows unsuccessful results, mostly because states' positions were decided before the conferences, and lobbying activities were not efficient enough to make things change.

prompting early responses; sharing information and analysis; researching and analyzing government policy; facilitating partner dialogue; negotiating joint policy platforms; coordinating joint action; planning and executing joint campaigns, and evaluating the effectiveness of joint responses" (Crisis Action, 2014).

This long extract from the official statement is interesting because it never mentions the word "communication." The methods used for campaigning are discreet, without resorting to the media, and mainly focus on high-level contacts, characteristics that were confirmed during our interview with Martin Konecny, In other words, this type of lobbying is 100% direct lobbying, undertaken at the highest possible level. They advance as major elements, an expert field research and analysis, a practical, imaginative policy, and as the figure 3 confirms it, a high-level advocacy. On the other hand, this strategy shows that efficient lobbying can be done only through face-to-face meetings and political dialogue within the European institutions.

Conclusion and Limitations

Our research reveals three different results:
- Lobbying, at least at the EU or UN level, should rely on the complete set of communication tools and channels able to reach different types of publics, in order to raise or maintain awareness, and finally convince decision-makers to vote for a law (national level) or a resolution (UN level).
- While discovering social media, NGOs would have better results if they followed the trends issued by private companies to promote their products: consideration and dialogue, both with policy-makers and their public.

- The proliferation of tools and channels available for delivering a message can conduct to deliver several "incoherent messages," i.e. messages more or less adapted to the specificity of each channel and to each public. In return, this creates an imprecise communication not in favour of the NGO.

As the result of the analysis, we conclude that many NGOs should increase their professionalism and the quality of their work. In other words, for efficient lobbying, NGOs should have a clear activity, with concrete goals, and should develop more precise actions of a higher quality.

These cases also reveal some limitations. If the theoretical framework developed above on lobbying, in particular on social issues, is mainly respected according to the interviews, each NGO can be seen to have developed a different strategy. Each of the studied actors acts within the boundaries defined by the available resources.

Another limitation could be the type of activities of each NGO. In other words, concentrating on high-level contact for the very sensitive issue of Israeli settlements could be the right approach in order to avoid media coverage and extremist claims or actions. Moreover, the Crisis Action case shows that it is not always necessary to respect the whole list of indicators in order to be successful. At this point in the research, we may raise two questions. Our framework may be completed by further research, in particular with the object of clearly distinguishing between the impacts of direct and indirect lobbying. What should be the ideal balance between the two dimensions? What might be the limitation of this model? How can we go more clearly into the description of the meaning and content of "high-level meetings" without going too far, according the indispensable secrets of the negotiation

procedures (see International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice, Peace Processes, Secret Negotiations and Civil Society, 2008)?

Lobbying is deeply linked to information management. At this point in the research, we think that tools and methodologies are becoming more and more similar between NGOs and corporate organizations. Communication is a key component. From an appointment with a diplomat to a demonstration covered by various different television channels, the cocktail (i.e. the communication strategy), developed with a coherent message, is important.

Describing and defining indicators is a difficult task. Digital media are easy to quantify, but a qualitative assessment should also be conducted. For meetings and inside lobbying with policy-makers, success is related to interpersonal communication and persuasion.

In Brussels, most agents don't clearly differentiate between advocacy and lobbying. Methodologies seem rather similar. Among the three NGOs studied, one uses a complete set of social media tools, another makes use of social media but without a clear strategy, and the last one doesn't use these media at all, focusing instead on high-level contacts. Therefore, assessing the efficiency of lobbying strategies remains a difficult task, especially because the combination of tools and persons, communication and contacts, may differ according to the goal of the campaign or the resources available.

As with "The Art of War" (McNeilly, 2001), or "The Art of Negotiation" (Arifon, 2010), we would like to end this work with a general thought. Lobbying can be considered an art, engaging personal communication, information management, influence, and communication channels in a multidimensional cocktail.

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